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Abstract 
This paper aims to reconstruct Francis Hutcheson’s thinking about liberty. Since 
he does not offer a detailed treatment of philosophical questions concerning 
liberty in his mature philosophical writings I turn to a textbook on metaphysics. 
We can assume that he prepared the textbook during the 1720s in Dublin. This 
textbook deserves more attention. First, it sheds light on Hutcheson’s role as a 
teacher in Ireland and Scotland. Second, Hutcheson’s contributions to 
metaphysical disputes are more original than sometimes assumed. To appreciate 
his independent thinking, I argue, it is helpful to take the intellectual debates in 
Ireland into consideration, including William King’s defence of free will and 
discussions of Shaftesbury’s views in Robert Molesworth’s intellectual circle. 
Rather than taking a stance on the philosophical disputes about liberty, I argue 
that Hutcheson aims to shift the focus of the debates towards practical questions 
concerning control of desire, cultivation of habits, and character development.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) is best known for his mature works on aesthetics and moral 
philosophy. It may be surprising that these works contain little direct engagement with questions 
of liberty, especially since many of his predecessors and contemporaries in Britain and Ireland 
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are involved in controversial debates about liberty and necessity.1 Hutcheson does not entirely 
neglect questions of liberty2, but to gain insight into his understanding of liberty it is informative 
to turn to a Latin textbook on metaphysics, entitled Metaphysicae Synopsis: Ontologiam, et 
Pneumatologiam, Complectens [A Synopsis of Metaphysics Comprehending Ontology and Pneumatology, 
hereafter short ‘Metaphysics’],3 that he prepared for the instruction of students and probably 
composed in the 1720s during his time in Dublin. Yet a note of caution is in order from the 
outset. The first edition of Metaphysics was published without his consent in 1742 and although a 
second revised edition was published during his lifetime in 1744, he never fully endorsed the 
work.4 This textbook was first and foremost a manual for teaching students and its content is 
constrained by the curriculum at the University of Glasgow.  Despite Hutcheson’s ambivalence 
about Metaphysics, I believe that it deserves more attention than it has received so far. First, the 
fact that he prepared a textbook on metaphysics sheds light on his role in the education of 
students in Ireland and Scotland, as I explain in more detail in section 2. Growing up as a 
Presbyterian in Ireland, Hutcheson, like many fellow Irish Presbyterians, had to travel to 
Scotland to earn a university degree and the intellectual and social context in both Ireland and 
Scotland shape his intellectual development and philosophical thinking. Second, I believe that 
Metaphysics despite being a textbook is more original than sometimes assumed. Although 
Metaphysics offers in the first instance a critical commentary on a textbook by the Dutch 
metaphysician Gerard de Vries and Hutcheson certainly draws on John Locke’s philosophy to 
challenge the positions presented in de Vries’s textbook, it is helpful to take the intellectual 
																																																						
1 For instance, see John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [1690]), II.xxvii; William King, De Origine Mali (London: Printed 
by Benj. Tooke, 1702). King’s De Origine Mali has been translated by Edmund Law into English. 
See William King, An Essay on the Origin of Evil. To Which Is Added, a Sermon by the Same Author, on 
the Fall of Man., ed. Edmund Law, trans. Edmund Law, fifth ed., revised ed. (London: Printed for 
R. Fauldner and T. and J. Merril, 1781). For further discussion and background, see James A. 
Harris, Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2005); Kenneth L. Pearce, 'William King on Free Will', Philosophers' Imprint 19 
(2019). 
2 In the following I use the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ interchangeably. Most of the primary 
texts that this paper focuses on were originally written in Latin. The Latin term ‘libertas’ can be 
translated as ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ into English.  
3 This work was not translated into English until 2006. The English translation is included in 
Francis Hutcheson, Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind, ed. James Moore and 
Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006 [1742]). 
4 See James Moore, 'Introduction', in Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind, by 
Francis Hutcheson, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006); 
James Moore, 'The Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson: On the Origins of the Scottish 
Englightenment', in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990).
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context in Ireland into consideration to better appreciate Hutcheson’s own contributions to the 
philosophical debates. In section 3, after briefly providing further background about 
Hutcheson’s textbook Metaphysics and its importance for the instruction of students, I examine 
closely how Hutcheson understands liberty and the will in Metaphysics. By showing that his view 
departs both from de Vries’s and Locke’s views, I intend to bring to light the independence of 
his thought. I propose that Hutcheson rather than trying to take a stance on metaphysical 
disputes about liberty aims to shift the focus of the debates and emphasizes the importance of 
controlling desires and cultivating right habits. Since these practical tasks do not presuppose a 
particular understanding of liberty, we can see why he is not very invested in settling the 
theoretical disputes about liberty. In section 4, I turn to his mature philosophical writings. His 
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense includes a 
critical response to William King’s defence of libertarian free will. Although Hutcheson can be 
seen as more critical about libertarian freedom in this work than in his textbook, his overall 
strategy is to show that as far as practical considerations are concerned there is no need to adopt 
the libertarian view that freedom requires an agent’s choices be entirely undetermined, meaning 
that the agent is in a position to both choose an action and its opposite, since attributions of 
merit and praise are not grounded in free rational choice.  Instead we are better advised to focus 
on character development.  
 
 
2. Education in Ireland and Scotland 
 
Francis Hutcheson was born in 1694 in Drumalig near Saintfield, County Down, in Ulster. Both 
his father John Hutcheson (d. 1729) and grandfather Alexander Hutcheson (d. 1711) were 
Presbyterian ministers.5 Hutcheson’s family, like many other Presbyterians in Ireland, had roots 
in Scotland. 
Although Scottish settlers had migrated to Ireland, and Ulster in particular, for centuries, 
an organized colonization process during the reign of King James I (who was formerly King of 
Scotland as James VI) brought many Scots to Ulster at the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
where they were granted land.6 These Scottish settlers established Presbyterian congregations in 
Ulster. Although Presbyterians were initially happy to be part of the Church of Ireland due to 
																																																						
5 See James Moore, 'Hutcheson, Francis (1694–1746)', in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
6 For further details, see Thomas Bartlett, Ireland: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 99–109. 
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their shared Protestant heritage, rifts between Irish Presbyterians and the Church of Ireland 
started to grow during the middle of the seventeenth century as the episcopal Church of Ireland 
became less tolerant of non-Anglican Protestants, whom it termed ‘dissenters’. The Church of 
Ireland, as the established church, started to apply penalties for religious non-conformity to 
Presbyterians and other dissenting Protestants; thereby they expanded practices that formerly 
targeted only Catholics. The exclusion of Presbyterians, other Protestant dissenters, and 
Catholics under the suite of Penal Laws had political motivations and meant that those who did 
not belong to the Church of Ireland were not in a position to hold public offices. Furthermore, 
they were excluded from attending Trinity College Dublin, the only University in Ireland during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.7 Political, economic, and educational affairs in Ireland 
were predominantly in the hands of members of the Church of Ireland, and the Westminster 
Parliament too sought to exert its claim to rule. It is worth adding that those in political power in 
Ireland were not representative of the Irish population as a whole. At least three quarters of the 
population in Ireland was Catholic, and the much smaller Protestant part of the population was 
split into Presbyterians, who were mainly based in Ulster and Dublin, and Anglicans, who 
belonged to the Church of Ireland. 8  Although Presbyterians in Ireland were not prevented from 
religious worship (as were Catholics), they lacked political rights. Since they could not acquire a 
university degree in Ireland, many moved to Scotland for study and for many the University of 
Glasgow was the university of choice.9 As of 1691, anyone who intended to become a 
Presbyterian minister needed to have a university degree, which commonly meant matriculation 
at a Scottish university for an arts degree.10 The four-year degree included training in logic, 
metaphysics, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy. Preparation for the Presbyterian 
Ministry required further four years of studies in Divinity after the completion of the arts 
degree.11 Since study outside Ireland was costly, several dissenting academies—called ‘philosophy 
schools’ in their day—were established that were meant to prepare students for study at Scottish 
																																																						
7 For further details, see Bartlett, Ireland, 141, 163–167; Michael Brown, The Irish Enlightenment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 112–117; R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600–
1972 (London: Penguin Books, 1989), 124–125. 
8 See Bartlett, Ireland, 143–158. For an accessible overview of the issues, see C. M. Barry, 
'Toleration in 18th Century Ireland', Irish Philosophy Blog,  
http://www.irishphilosophy.com/2016/11/17/toleration-18th-century/. 
9 See Ian McBride, 'The School of Virtue: Francis Hutcheson, Irish Presbyterians and the 
Scottish Enlightenment', in Political Thought in Ireland since the Seventeenth Century, ed. D. George 
Boyce, Robert Eccleshall, and Vincent Geoghegan (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 
74; Moore, 'Hutcheson, Francis (1694–1746)'; Moore, 'Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson', 43. 
10 See David Steers, '"The Very Life-Blood of Nonconfirmity Is Education": The Killyleagh 
Philosophy School, County Down,' Familia 28 (2012): 62. 
11 This was decided by the General Synod in 1702. See Steers, 'Killyleagh Philosophy School', 64. 
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universities and made it possible for them to abridge their studies in Scotland for the arts 
degree.12  
This religious and political context shapes Francis Hutcheson’s upbringing and 
education. From 1702 until 1707 he attends a local School in Saintfield, County Down, and then 
continues his education at a dissenting academy in Killyleagh, County Down, between 1707 and 
1710. His training in Killyleagh made it possible to enter the fourth and final year when he starts 
his studies at the University of Glasgow in 1710/11. There he joins the natural philosophy class 
of John Louden. After his graduation Hutcheson remains in Glasgow and studies classical 
literature for a year before beginning training in Divinity in 1712/13 to become a minister in the 
Presbyterian church.13    
In 1718 Hutcheson returns to Ulster with the intention of becoming a Presbyterian 
minister. However, his career path changes in 1719 when he accepts an invitation to run a 
dissenting academy in Dublin, which is the beginning of his career as a teacher. The Toleration 
Act of 1719 gave more protection to Presbyterians and other Protestant dissenters and made it 
possible for them to run schools like the dissenting academy that was founded in Dublin.14 His 
role at the academy in Dublin involves preparing the next generation of students for study in 
Scotland, and Glasgow in particular, like the training he received in Killyleagh that prepared him 
for study at Glasgow.15 This means that the courses that he teaches in Dublin are meant to 
resemble the courses that other students attend at Glasgow so that the Irish-based students can 
abridge their subsequent studies in Scotland. Thus, we can assume that his teaching included 
logic, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. It is further very probable that he composed 
textbooks on logic and metaphysics during the 1720s while he teaches at the Dublin academy.16 
Although neither of these textbooks were published during these years, Hutcheson did not teach 
logic and metaphysics courses again after he left Dublin to take up the chair of moral philosophy 
at the University of Glasgow, to which he was appointed in December 1729 as Gershom 
Carmichael’s successor.17  
																																																						
12 For helpful further discussion and insight into the curriculum of dissenting academies, see 
Steers, ‘Killyleagh Philosophy School’.   
13 See Moore, ‘Hutcheson, Francis (1694–1746)’.  
14 See Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and 
Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 155. 
15 See Moore, 'Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson', 45. 
16 English translations of both textbooks can be found in Hutcheson, Logic, Metaphysics, and the 
Natural Sociability of Mankind. 
17 See Moore, 'Introduction', xxii–xxiii. 
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Hutcheson’s teaching in Dublin is certainly constrained by the curriculum at Scottish 
universities. In his inaugural lecture, delivered at Glasgow in 1730, he recalls being ‘involved in 
laborious and tedious business’18 during the years in Dublin, but this reflection seems 
overshadowed by modesty. Hutcheson has fond memories of his formative years as a student at 
Glasgow and is genuinely delighted to return to his alma mater as professor of moral 
philosophy.19 Yet the years that he spent in Ireland during the 1720s were no less important for 
his intellectual development and he is very productive and intellectually creative during this time 
of his life. He published two major works, namely An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue (1725) and An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728) during these years. Furthermore, the intellectual milieu in 
Dublin and Ireland informs the development of his philosophical views and helps him find his 
own philosophical voice.20  
In the following I want to pay particular attention to his views on liberty and situate 
them within intellectual debates in Ireland. First, Hutcheson is well aware of William King’s 
libertarian defence of free will. William King (1650–1729), who was Bishop of Derry from 1691 
until being appointed as Archbishop of Dublin in 1703, publishes De Origine Mali in 1702. In this 
work, which examines the origin of evil, King argues that it is important to distinguish between 
natural and moral evil and that humans are responsible for moral evil in the world. Moral evil 
occurs because humans have free will. Although God could have created humans without free 
will and arranged the world such that they would only do good actions, King believes that free 
will is essential for human moral development, despite the fact that it can lead to moral evil.21  
Moreover, Robert Molesworth (1656–1725), who was an intellectual, merchant, and 
influential politician, was one of Hutcheson’s associates in Dublin.22 Molesworth supported 
Hutcheson’s intellectual development, and probably helped him as he began publishing his 
																																																						
18 Francis Hutcheson, 'On the Natural Sociability of Mankind: Inaugural Oration', in Logic, 
Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006 [1730]), 191. 
19 See Hutcheson, 'Natural Sociability', 191–192. 
20 For further details, see Michael Brown, Francis Hutcheson in Dublin, 1719–1730: The Crucible of 
His Thought (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002). 
21 For additional details of Hutcheson’s and King’s relationship, see Brown, Hutcheson in Dublin, 
ch. 6. 
22 It is not known how Hutcheson and Molesworth first met. Molesworth’s influence was not 
restricted to Dublin, but rather he also had an influence on student affairs in Glasgow in the 
1720s. For further discussion, see McBride, 'The School of Virtue: Francis Hutcheson, Irish 
Presbyterians and the Scottish Enlightenment', 82–86.  
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works, in a place where Hutcheson was seen as a dissenter and in need of political protection.23 
Molesworth was friends with several intellectuals, whose views were considered radical at that 
time, including John Toland and Anthony Collins. Molesworth was also a close friend of 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713) and we can assume that 
Hutcheson had the opportunity to engage with Shaftesbury’s works through Molesworth’s 
intellectual circle.24 Shaftesbury’s philosophy aims to revive ancient philosophical views, and 
emphasizes that philosophy should be practical and help us improve our lives. It offers a stark 
contrast to the natural law tradition that shaped university courses in moral philosophy. By 
encountering intellectual views that diverge from the standard university curriculum and that 
many would have regarded as radical Hutcheson had the opportunity to step back from the 
views that his teachers in Glasgow advanced and to broaden his understanding of the intellectual 
debates of his day. This no doubt aided him to develop his own philosophical voice.  
 
 
3. Liberty and the will in Hutcheson’s Metaphysics 
 
Hutcheson’s most detailed commentary on philosophical debates concerning liberty and the will 
can be found in his Latin textbook A Synopsis of Metaphysics. Although we cannot be confident 
that it reflects his considered views, it was influential for university teaching in Scotland 
throughout the eighteenth century.25 According to James Moore, Hutcheson’s Metaphysics offers a 
critical commentary on the Latin textbook Determinationes Ontologicae et Pneumatologicae by the 
Dutch metaphysician Gerard de Vries.26 De Vries’s textbook was regularly assigned at the 
University of Glasgow during the first half of the eighteenth century and recommended by John 
Louden in his metaphysics classes. Moore maintains further that Hutcheson draws on John 
Locke’s philosophy to challenge de Vries’s metaphysical views.27 In the following, I aim to show 
that Hutcheson’s approach to metaphysics is more original than this; it not only builds on de 
																																																						
23 For further details, see Brown, Hutcheson in Dublin, ch. 1. See also Moore, 'Two Systems of 
Francis Hutcheson', 46–47. 
24 See Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, 152–161; Daniel Carey, 'Francis Hutcheson's 
Philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment: Reception, Reputation, and Legacy', in Scottish 
Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century: Morals, Politics, Religion, ed. Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 37–38; McBride, 'The School of Virtue: Francis 
Hutcheson, Irish Presbyterians and the Scottish Enlightenment', 82–84. 
25 Two editions were published during Hutcheson’s lifetime in 1742 and an altered and enlarged 
edition in 1744, followed by five posthumous editions in 1749, 1756, 1762, 1774, and 1780. 
26 See Moore, 'Introduction', xiii–xvii. 
27 See Moore, 'Introduction', xv–xvi. 
 8 
Vries’s and Locke’s works, but also the intellectual debates in Ireland and beyond inform 
Hutcheson’s views and help him add his own voice to metaphysical debates. 
Hutcheson’s Metaphysics is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on being and 
the common attributes of things, the second on the human mind, and the third on God. For 
present purposes, the second part is most relevant. There Hutcheson adopts the common 
distinction between the understanding and the will and the second chapter on the will offers 
insight into his thinking about liberty. He introduces the understanding and the will as powers of 
the mind and claims that ‘the faculty of understanding and the faculty of willing … are 
concerned respectively with knowing things and with rendering life happy.’ 28 Although other 
philosophers of his day would agree with his characterization of the understanding, his claim that 
the will is concerned ‘with rendering life happy’ diverges from their accounts of the will. Neither 
de Vries nor Locke introduce the will in these terms. According to de Vries, the intellect 
concerns knowledge and the will concerns freedom.29 Locke introduces the will as follows: 
 
The Power of Thinking is called the Understanding, and the Power of Volition is called the 
Will, and these two Powers or Abilities in the Mind are denominated Faculties.30 
 
This Power which the mind has, thus to order the consideration of any Idea, or the 
forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and 
vice versâ in any particular instance is that which we call the Will.31 
 
This means that for Locke the will is a power of the mind, which is exercised in mental acts of 
volition. If a subsequent action (or its forbearance) is performed (or not performed) in 
accordance with the volition, the action (or its forbearance) is called voluntary.32 Since 
																																																						
28 Francis Hutcheson, A Synopsis of Metaphysics Comprehending Ontology and Pneumatology, ed. James 
Moore and Michael Silverthorne, Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006 [1742]), II.i.2, 112. 
29 See Gerard de Vries, Rerum Attributis Determinationes Ontologicae. Et De Natura Dei Et Humanae 
Mentis Determinationes Pneumatologicae, 6th ed ed. (Edinburgh: M. J. McEuen, J. Paton, & W. Broun, 
1718 [1690]), 106. The Latin reads as follows: ‘Sicuti de natura Intellectus est Conscientia, absque 
qua intellectio non foret talis, sic de natura Voluntatis est Libertas, absque qua nec volitio talis 
esset, sed brutus impetus. Estque, ejus, aeque ac ipisus voluntatis, adeo mens nostra sibi conscia, 
ut nullius rei magis.’ (106) 
30 Locke, Essay, II.vi.2. 
31 Locke, Essay, II.xxi.5. 
32 See Locke, Essay, II.xxi.5. 
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Hutcheson’s characterization of the will departs from both de Vries’s and Locke’s views, it is 
worth exploring further as to why he introduces the will in terms of happiness.  
According to Hutcheson, the will ‘seeks (appetens) every kind of pleasant sensation and all 
actions, events, or external things which seem likely to arouse them, and shuns and rejects 
everything contrary to them.’33  In a passage added to the second edition, Hutcheson explains 
that this is possible, because all humans constantly desire (appetitio) happiness, which he takes to 
be an innate feature of our human constitution.34 He further elaborates that ‘the mind, so long as 
it maintains a calm and provident motion35, is formed to seek every good thing in itself and to 
shun every evil; and when several things come before it which it cannot have all at the same 
time, it turns to those which seem greater and more excellent’.36  
His view that humans constantly seek happiness further rests on a distinction between 
two different kinds of desires.37 First, Hutcheson argues that there is sensual desire. We share this 
kind of desire with non-human animals and it ‘directs us toward pleasure by a kind of blind 
instinct’. 38 This means that the mind ‘is driven by a quite violent emotion of the mind to obtain 
certain sensual goods and to avoid sensual ills’.39 By contrast, the other kind of desire can be 
called rational desire and can be seen as will in the proper sense. It involves a ‘calm emotion which 
calls in the counsel of reason and pursues things that are judged, in the light of all the 
circumstances, to be superior, and are seized by a nobler sense’.40 
Since rational desire, can be seen as the will properly understood, let us consider how 
rational desire operates. First, Hutcheson argues, there is spontaneously arising desire or 
aversion, which is often followed by a process of deliberation during which the arguments for 
getting the things we desire and for avoiding the things that we dislike are carefully considered. 
After the process of deliberation is completed, ‘there follows an intention (propositum) or 
determination (consilium) to do those things that seem most likely to achieve the end’.41 Following 
the scholastics, the initial desire or aversion can be called ‘simple wanting’ and the intention to 
act, which follows the deliberative process, ‘efficacious volition’.42 
																																																						
33 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.1, 126. 
34 See Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.1, 126. 
35 The Latin expression is ‘motu fertur et provido’. The Latin adjective ‘providus’, which is here 
translated as ‘provident’, can also be translated as ‘prudent’. 
36 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.1, 126. 
37 See Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.1, 127. 
38 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.1, 127. 
39 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.1, 127. 
40 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.1, 127. 
41 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.2, 127. 
42 See Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.2, 127–128. 
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At first sight, it may appear that Hutcheson here adopts a version of Locke’s account of 
the suspension of desire.43 As Locke prepares the second edition of his Essay, which was 
published in 1694, he heavily revises the chapter ‘Of Power’, which is chapter xxi of Book II. As 
part of the revisions he adds his so-called doctrine of the suspension of desire. In the second 
edition Locke explicitly distinguishes between desire and volition.44 While a volition to do action 
A, commonly leads to the performance of A, desires are better understood as wishes and not all 
desires lead to action. Indeed, there can be multiple and conflicting desires. Commonly our 
strongest and most pressing desire results in a volition, which in turn leads to action, provided 
there are no external impediments preventing the action.45 However, the path from desire to 
volition is not an automatic process. Locke’s second edition view is that intelligent beings have 
the power to suspend any of their desires until they have properly examined the good or evil of 
the desired things in question. This means that we can ‘hold our wills undetermined, till we have 
examin’d the good or evil of what we desire’.46 
Despite the apparent similarities between Locke’s account of suspension of desire and 
Hutcheson’s understanding of rational desire, I believe that it is important to acknowledge that 
Hutcheson does not wholeheartedly endorse Locke’s views on agency, liberty, and motivation. 
Differences between their views come to light if we consider how they each understand 
motivation. Overall, Hutcheson offers a more intellectual account of motivation than Locke. In 
the first edition of the Essay Locke argues that the greater good alone determines the will.47 
Locke was prompted by William Molyneux and William King to rethink his first edition account, 
who worry that his first edition view is too intellectual. For instance, Molyneux in a letter, dated 
22 December 1692, challenges Locke’s position by claiming that ‘you seem to make all Sins to 
proceed from the Understanding, or to be against Conscience; and not at all from the Depravity 
of our Wills.’48 Molyneux here shares a concern that King has expressed in remarks that King 
prepared upon Molyneux’s request on Locke’s Essay and which Molyneux sent to Locke 
appended to a letter, dated 15 October 1692.49 King, who believes that moral evil exists, because 
God has created humans with free will, since he regards free will as essential for moral 
																																																						
43 See Locke, Essay, E2–5 II.xxvii.47, 50–52. 
44 See Locke, Essay, E2–5 II.xxi.30. 
45 See Locke, Essay, E2–5 II.xxi.40, 47. 
46 See Locke, Essay, E2–5 II.xxi.52. 
47 See Locke, Essay, E1 II.xxi.29. 
48 John Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E. S. de Beer, 8 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976–1989), letter no 1597, 4:601. 
49 See Locke, Correspondence, letter no 1544, 4:541. For further discussion, see Stefan Storrie, 
'William King’s Influence on Locke’s Second Edition Change of Mind About Human Action 
and Freedom', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2019). 
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development, criticizes Locke’s view, because King is concerned that on Locke’s view God 
would be responsible for sin and evil. Locke changed his view concerning motivation and rather 
than assuming that the greater good alone motivates, his new revised view is that only uneasiness 
determines the will.50  
Hutcheson does not share Locke’s second edition account of motivation. Instead 
Hutcheson’s understanding of motivation comes closer to Locke’s first than his second edition 
account. Furthermore, Hutcheson emphasizes the importance of controlling desires and 
cultivating right habits. To see how Hutcheson’s view differs from Locke’s and other influential 
views of his day, it is helpful to turn to his views on liberty and humans’ ability to control their 
desires.  
Hutcheson, like de Vries and Gershom Carmichael, acknowledges that his predecessors 
have grappled with the difficult question of how liberty is best understood.51 The controversial 
question, Hutcheson maintains, concerns whether liberty is a power ‘to set [oneself] to will a thing 
or its contrary equally, which is called the liberty of contrariety (as if one were to say that he can desire 
and pursue either that which seems to him pleasant or that which appears harmful and 
annoying),’ or is it ‘at least the power to set [oneself] to act or not to act, to will or not to will, which is the 
liberty of contradiction.’52 The former kind of freedom requires a subject to be both able to will an 
action and its contrary, which means that it is an indifferent power of the mind to turn in any 
direction. The latter concerns a subject’s ability to enter into an act of willing or not willing, or of 
doing what one wills or omitting what one does not will. Hutcheson invokes these different 
definitions of liberty also in a subsequent section that addresses the question ‘Where liberty lies’. 
Since this section sheds light on Hutcheson’s thinking, it is worth citing the first paragraph in 
full: 
 
Since the sentiment of the mind after completing its deliberation does not depend on the 
will, but necessarily follows the evidence of truth which is put before it, and [since] no 
previous command of the will arouses simple wishing or the initial desire or aversion, 
there is no question of liberty here at all, whether liberty is taken as the power of doing what we 
wish and omitting what we do not wish, or a certain indifferent power of the mind to turn equally in any 
																																																						
50 See Locke, Essay, E2–5 II.xxi.29, 31–40. 
51 See Hutcheson, Metaphysics, I.iv.6, 97–99, II.ii.3, 129–131. See also de Vries, Rerum Attributis 
Determinationes Ontologicae. Et De Natura Dei Et Humanae Mentis Determinationes Pneumatologicae, 38, 
106–110; Gershom Carmichael, Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The 
Writings of Gershom Carmichael, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 2002), 34–38. 
52 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, I.iv.6, 97. 
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direction. If therefore liberty is a faculty which, given all the conditions for action, may act or not act, 
do one thing or its contrary, it will only have place in an actual intention to act or in an 
efficacious volition, according to whether we can initiate [the volition] or suppress it by a 
previous decision of the will. But if this power pays no attention to the appearances of 
good or evil which are put before it or fails to follow them, it would seem to be a useless 
and capricious [power]. Anyone, therefore, who finds it absurd that our minds should be 
endowed with a power which in no way certainly follows our judgment will have to 
define it to mean merely a power of doing what we wish and of refraining when we do not wish, 
however much the mind may have been constrained to wish or not.53 
 
While Hutcheson does not offer a new and original definition of liberty, he shifts the focus of 
the debates by emphasizing the importance of acting in accordance with ‘the evidence of truth’. 
This means that once the process of deliberation of the various desires is completed, one should 
identify the ultimate intention or efficacious volition guided by truth. This means that if one 
deliberates which desire to pursue, say the desire to do A or the desire to refrain from doing A, 
then one should pay attention to the good or evil that are inherent in or result from the action or 
omission of the action. Thus, for Hutcheson the primary question is not to settle which 
definition of liberty is to be preferred, but rather that deliberation is guided by moral truth. This 
is not meant to suggest that he regards the different positions on liberty to be equally plausible.  
In the second edition of Metaphysics Hutcheson adds commentaries that outline how 
Stoic philosophers and Peripatetic philosophers would engage with the textbook questions 
concerning liberty.54 The fact that he consults sources that find no explicit treatment in de Vries’s 
textbook and Locke’s Essay is another indication that he moves beyond their views. Stoic 
philosophers argue that ‘nothing arises without a cause’.55 Since causes cannot go in opposite 
directions, they believe that totally indifferent causes are impossible. Thus, Stoics would reject 
freedom of contrariety. Rather their view is ‘that the will is constrained and directed by each 
man’s character’.56 By contrast, Peripatetic philosophers offer critical responses to determinism, 
as defended by Stoic philosophers, and argue that ‘the nature of rational causes [is such] that they 
																																																						
53 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.3, 129. 
54 See Hutcheson, Metaphysics, I.iv.6, 97–98, II.ii.3, 129–131. Hutcheson was especially interested 
in the works of the Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius and contributed to a translation of his 
Meditations. Aurelius’s views on liberty can be found in Francis Hutcheson and James Moor, The 
Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antonius, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008 [1742]), X.33, 129–133.  
55 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, I.iv.6, 98. 
56 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.3, 129. 
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can move in any direction, and that this characteristic is theirs by nature’.57 In the first instance 
Hutcheson outlines the views of Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers, as one may expect in a 
textbook designed for students. However, is he merely a neutral commentator, or does he add 
his own voice to the debates? First, it is worth noting that the Stoic position receives more 
detailed consideration than the views of the Peripatetics, which could be seen as intimating that 
he leans towards the Stoic position. Yet there is no clear indication that he aims to defend one 
position against the other. This opens another interpretive option, namely that he does not 
regard the views as rival theories and thus he sees no need to settle the dispute.58 Just as he does 
not clearly argue in favour of one definition of liberty against another, he does not clearly take a 
stance regarding the disputes between Stoics and Peripatetics. Instead of seeing this as a 
weakness of his contribution to the debates, I want to propose that he intends to shift the focus 
of the debate. Hutcheson emphasizes the importance of making choices and forming intentions, 
or efficacious volitions, that are guided by truth and that will promote goodness and happiness, 
but in order to make choices guided by truth, he does not have to settle philosophical disputes 
about liberty that are in the focus of student textbooks such as the question whether liberty is 
better understood as liberty of contrariety or liberty of contraction. On the one hand, if our will 
is indifferent and both options are equally open, it would be irrational to form the volition to 
perform an action that is evil or has evil consequences. On the other hand, if choices are 
determined, it will be important to cultivate right habits and to train the mind in such a way that 
it can control desires. Hutcheson’s engagement with Stoic and Peripatetic views helps prepare 
the next issue to which he turns, namely the question of what control humans have over their 
desire.59  
Hutcheson not only argues that calm desires are superior, since they correspond to 
goods, but also that we are able to direct our mind to suppress desires for bad things and to 
pursue superior desires: 
 
Whatever men’s freedom may be, if adequate signs of superior goods are put before 
them, anyone who has carefully examined the things which arouse desire, and has 
directed the powers of his mind to this thing, [will find that] all his appetites and desires 
will be stronger or milder in proportion to the goods themselves. Everyone, therefore, 
who has seriously done this will be able to make all his desires for superior goods and 
																																																						
57 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, I.iv.6, 98, see also II.ii.3, 130–131. 
58 According to Moore, 'Introduction', xxv–xxvii., Hutcheson can be seen as attempting to 
reconcile Stoic and Peripatetic views.  
59 See Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.3, 131. 
 14 
aversion from the graver evils so strong that he will easily be able at need to suppress 
weaker desires for bad things and his aversion to lesser evils. Thus he will be able to 
shape the whole pattern of his life, so that he will pursue all the nobler goods and ignore 
all the lower things which are incompatible with them.60 
 
For Hutcheson the important task is that humans properly control their desires, but to do so, it 
is not relevant to quibble about the different definitions of liberty that his contemporaries offer. 
To see how exactly humans can control their desires it is helpful to turn to another passage 
where Hutcheson argues that violent emotions or lower desires gain force due to incautious 
association of ideas.61 It is not uncommon that we erroneously associate happiness with certain 
things and pain and evil with other things. For instance, assume that Sarah was planning to help 
her friend, but on her way to her friend broke her leg. Since then she associates helping friends 
with evil and has stopped helping friends. In this example Sarah mistakenly associates helping 
friends with evil. Hutcheson believes that there are many other examples of incautious 
associations of ideas, but that we can gain control over violent emotions if we carefully examine 
our associations of ideas and separate the ideas or notions we combined erroneously and 
carelessly.62  He writes: 
 
If we are to achieve a just command of these desires and true freedom of mind, it would 
be very helpful to separate and take apart these notions which we have so carelessly put 
together, and take a long, hard look at those things that stimulate the appetite, stripping 
them of these stolen colors; so that we may discover and learn for ourselves what real 
good and evil is in each of them, and so that we may not seek or shun them beyond the 
measure of true good and evil.63  
 
On this basis, it can be said that Hutcheson’s contribution to debates about liberty that 
received attention in textbooks used in Scottish universities lies in his shift of focus towards 
																																																						
60 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.3, 131. 
61 See Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.6, 136–137. 
62 See also Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002 [1728]), 20–21, 
28, 65–86, 92–93, 104–105, 108–112, 131–132. For further discussion, see Michael B. Gill, 
'Fantastick Associations and Addictive General Rules: A Fundamental Difference between 
Hutcheson and Hume', Hume Studies 22 (1996). I have also learned from forthcoming work by 
Kathryn Tabb and John P. Wright on association in eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy. 
63 Hutcheson, Metaphysics, II.ii.6, 136–137. 
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practical questions of how we are best able to attain goodness and happiness. He believes that 
we are able to control our desires and through the cultivation of right habits and proper 
examination of association of ideas we can train our mind to pursue superior desires. Since these 
practical aims are consistent with different ways of understanding liberty, there is no need to 
settle the dispute as far as practical purposes are concerned. 
This shift towards practical questions of self-control has roots in ancient philosophy, but 
can also be found in Shaftesbury’s philosophy.64 Shaftesbury, like Hutcheson, has great 
admiration for ancient philosophy. In his major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times he argues that philosophy should be practical and help us improve our lives and criticizes 
purely speculative philosophical disputes. In Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author – one work included 
in Characteristicks – Shaftesbury emphasizes the importance of becoming an author of one’s own 
life, of governing one’s passions, and cultivating true and noble character. In his Inquiry concerning 
Virtue or Merit – another work included in Characteristicks – he regards pleasures of the mind as 
superior to those of the body and that mental enjoyments are the only means to attain certain 
and solid happiness.65 Shaftesbury’s philosophical ideas were debated in Robert Molesworth’s 
circle and thus we can assume that Hutcheson has had the opportunity to engage with 
Shaftesbury’s philosophy during his years in Dublin. This intellectual context in Dublin certainly 
played a role in Hutcheson’s intellectual development and presumably stimulated him to move 
beyond the issues presented in textbooks and to add his own voice to debates about liberty.  
 
 
4. Liberty and the will in Hutcheson’s mature writings 
 
Since Hutcheson does not devote a chapter or section in his mature writings to philosophical 
debates about liberty, we have limited textual resources to reconstruct his mature thinking about 
liberty. The mere fact that he has little to say about liberty can be seen as further evidence that he 
does not see the need to settle the philosophical debates that concerned his predecessors and 
contemporaries. Instead he is more concerned with debates about human nature and aims to 
show that humans are not merely self-interested beings, but have also benevolent affections 
																																																						
64 See Ruth Boeker, 'Shaftesbury on Liberty and Self-Mastery', International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 27 (2019). Among the ancient sources, Hutcheson is well acquainted with Marcus 
Aurelius’s philosophy and contributed to an English translation of his Mediations, which was 
submitted for publication in 1742. 
65 See Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, Third Earl of, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times, ed. Douglas J. den Uyl, 3 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001 [1711]), 2:58. 
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towards others that are not reducible to self-love.66 As he advances his own views concerning 
human nature he anticipates potential objections. In particular, he intends to show that William 
King’s understanding of liberty does not undermine his philosophical position.67 I will examine 
Hutcheson’s response to King more closely below, but first let me comment on how Hutcheson 
advances philosophical studies of the human mind and our mental capacities.  
Hutcheson defends the view that there are not only the five well-known external senses, 
sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, but that we are also constituted with several other senses. 
By a sense he understands the mind’s independent capacity to receive ideas ‘and to have Perceptions 
of Pleasure and Pain’.68  Besides external senses, he asserts that we have an internal sense, which 
concerns the pleasures of the imagination and makes it possible to have ‘Pleasant Perceptions 
arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects’,69 a public sense, which concerns ‘“our 
Determinations to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy with their Misery”’,70 
a moral sense, ‘by which “we perceive Virtue, or Vice in our selves, or others”’,71 and a sense of 
honour, ‘“which makes the Approbation, or Gratitude of others, for any good Actions we have 
done, the necessary occasion of Pleasure; and their Dislike, Condemnation, or Resentment of Injuries 
done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called Shame, even when we fear no further 
evil from them”’.72  
Hutcheson further argues that corresponding to each type of sense there is a particular 
type of desire. Desires are part of our human constitution and they arise ‘upon Apprehension of 
Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our selves or others the agreeable 
Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil’.73 
He identifies the following classes of desire: 
 
1. The Desire of sensual Pleasure, (by which we mean that of the external Senses); and 
Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the Pleasures of Imagination or Internal 
Sense, and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the Pleasures arising from 
Publick Happiness, and Aversion to the Pains arising from the Misery of others. 4. Desires of 
																																																						
66 See Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, ed. Wolfgang 
Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004 [1725]); Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations. 
67 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 178–182. 
68 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 17. 
69 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 17. 
70 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 17. 
71 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 17. 
72 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 18. 
73 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 18. 
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Virtue, and Aversion to Vice, according to the Notions we have of the Tendency of 
Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of Honour, and Aversion to 
Shame.74 
 
The distinction that Hutcheson draws between different senses, on the one hand, and 
different desires, on the other hand, mirrors the distinction between the understanding and the 
will.75 The different senses that he identifies are mental capacities that enable us to receive ideas, 
while the various desires enable us to attain good and to avoid evil. Identifying several different 
senses and corresponding desires helps Hutcheson establish his view that humans are not merely 
self-interested beings, but also benevolent and that benevolence is an inherent part of human 
nature. 
Hutcheson is interested in understanding human action and examines what excites us to 
choose one action over another. He distinguishes between the reasons that excite actions from 
the reasons that justify actions and claims ‘that all exciting Reasons presuppose Instincts and 
Affections; and the justifying presuppose a Moral Sense’.76 This thesis enables Hutcheson to challenge 
rationalist views about motivation. If this is correct, it follows that reason alone cannot motivate 
or excite action, but rather the presence of instincts or affections is required. He elaborates:  
 
As to exciting Reasons, in every calm rational Action some end is desired or intended; no 
end can be intended or desired previously to some one of these Classes of Affections, 
Self-Love, Self-Hatred, or desire of private Misery, (if this be possible) Benevolence toward 
others, or Malice: All Affections are included under these; no end can be previous to them 
all; there can therefore be no exciting Reason previous to Affection.77  
 
Yet Hutcheson anticipates that his thesis that reason alone cannot excite actions and 
always presupposes some instinct or affection will be questioned by his contemporaries, like 
																																																						
74 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 18–19. 
75 This reading is supported by the following statement: ‘Whereas Desire is as distinct from any 
Sensation, as the Will is from the Understanding or Senses.’ (Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 28–
29.) 
76 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 138. According to Aaron Garrett, 'Introduction', in An Essay 
on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, by Francis 
Hutcheson, ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), xvii., Hutcheson borrows the 
distinction from Hugo Grotius to challenge rationalist accounts of motivation. See Hugo 
Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, ed. Stephen C. Neff (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), II.i.1.  
77 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 139. 
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King, who defend libertarian free will and argue that we can freely determine our actions and 
who take this to be crucial for merit and praiseworthiness.78 According to King, free will consists 
in a faculty of election.79 Hutcheson asks whether ‘determining our selves freely … mean[s] acting 
without any Motive or exciting Reason’.80 If it does not mean that one acts without a motive or 
exciting reason, then ‘it cannot be opposed to acting from Instinct or Affections, since all Motives or 
Reasons presuppose them’.81 Alternatively, it could mean that only actions done without any 
motive or exciting reason are meritorious. Such actions would be actions done ‘by mere Election 
without prepollent Desire of one Action or End rather than its opposite, or without Desire of that 
Pleasure which some do suppose follows upon any Election’.82 This means that one could not 
prefer an action over its opposite. Hutcheson asks us to consider whether anyone ever acts in 
this way, namely merely by election without any prior desire. Furthermore, he asks whether we 
would approve of such an action.  
 
Upon seeing a Person not more disposed by Affection, Compassion, or Love or Desire, to 
make his Country happy than miserable, yet choosing the one rather than the other, from 
no Desire of publick Happiness, nor Aversion to the Torments of others, but by such an 
unaffectionate Determination, as that by which one moves his first Finger rather than the second, 
in giving an Instance of a trifling Action; let any one ask if this Action should be meritorious: 
and yet that there should be no Merit in a tender compassionate Heart, which shrinks at every 
Pain of its Fellow-Creatures, and triumphs in their Happiness; with kind Affections and strong 
Desire labouring for the publick Good. If this be the Nature of meritorious Actions; I fancy 
every honest Heart would disclaim all Merit in Morals, as violently as the old Protestants 
																																																						
78 See Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 178–182. 
79 See King, De Origine Mali, 5.1.3. King describes the faculty of election as follows: ‘if then we 
suppose such a power as this, it is plain, that the agent endowed with it cannot be determined in 
its operations by any pre-existent goodness in the object; for since the agreeableness between it 
and the objects, at least in most of them, is supposed to arise from the determination, the 
agreeableness cannot possibly be the cause of that determination on which itself depends. But 
the congruity of the object with the faculty is all the goodness in it, therefore there is nothing 
good in regard to this power, at least in those object to which it is indifferent, till it has embraced 
it, nor evil till it has rejected it: since the determination of the power to the object is prior to the 
goodness and the cause of it, this power cannot be determined by that goodness in its 
operations.’ (Essay on the Origin of Evil, 5.1.3.5) For further discussion, see Pearce, ‘William King 
on Free Will’.  
80 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 179. 
81 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 179. 
82 Hutcheson, Essay, with Illustrations, 179. 
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rejected it in Justification.83  
  
This leads Hutcheson to question the view that he ascribes to King, namely that merit or 
praiseworthiness is founded on unaffectionate choice, or mere election.84 He proposes, ‘[b]ut 
perhaps ’tis not the mere Freedom of Choice which is approved, but the free Choice of publick Good, 
without any Affection. Then Actions are approved for publick Usefulness, and not for Freedom.’85 
Alternatively, it is possible that neither mere election alone nor public usefulness alone are 
meritorious, but rather both are jointly required for merit. However, could we praise a 
manufacturer whose work is publicly useful? Hutcheson believes that in the absence of a kind 
affection or desire of public good such actions are not meritorious.86  
According to Hutcheson, philosophers who defend libertarian free will and emphasize 
the importance of rational choice often fail to acknowledge that in addition to violent passions 
and desires there are calm desires and affections; and that they confound reason with calm 
desires and affections. Since violent passions often lead to negative consequences not just for 
individuals but also for society, Hutcheson believes that they must be properly managed and we 
should focus on cultivating a calm temper or character. Again, we see that Hutcheson believes 
that upon closer inspection arguments by defenders of free will prove irrelevant and instead it is 
more important to focus on character development and the cultivation of right habits.87  
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